
A Comparative Study of Political Islam with Modernity in the First Pahlavi Era with a Discourse Approach

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Abstract

Purpose: In this study, the sociological model of the conflict between political Islam, jurisprudence and modernity in contemporary Iran (with emphasis on the Pahlavi era) has been studied.

Methodology: The present research method is based on discourse methodology.

Findings: We find that based on the main hypothesis, which seems to be the incomplete understanding of traditional political jurisprudence of the logic of modernity on the one hand and the concern for the rule of modernity values on the other hand has caused a confrontation between the two currents. Findings indicate that due to the passage of time and the need for more tendency of the traditional world to the world of modernity and society is facing modernization and scientific changes; Technical;

Conclusion: The new world requires the adaptation of both traditional and modern tendencies to harmonize and create a new culture, so it is very important to advance the modern or traditional goals of culture and adaptation in society.

Keywords:

Modernity, Political Islam,
Jurisprudence, Pahlavi Era

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1. Introduction

In the study of different intellectual and political currents in contemporary Iran, there are different views, one of which is political-jurisprudential Islam. Political jurisprudential Islam here refers to any tendency towards the Islamic tradition versus the West and the tendency towards Islamic traditions.

The most important indicators of political and jurisprudential Islam are reliance on Islamic teachings in individual and social life. On the other hand, the concept of modernity is a term for the wholeness of what has been known as a western culture since the sixteenth century and focuses more on a process in which actors are constantly involved and change, but the combination of these developments has created a single identity. The West has lived in this space for more than four centuries and Iranian society has faced it since the nineteenth century (Hekmat, 2015: 3). Modernity means that from the seventeenth century to about the middle of the twentieth century, in the Western world, which is the origin of modernity, there have been changes in various fields of culture, worldview, politics, art, economics, industry, etc. According to them, the features of modernity can be known. These developments can be divided into two categories of hardware and software developments of modernity. The changes that have taken place in the field of industry and technology and have affected the appearance of people's lives are the hardware changes of modernity. According to the German thinker Habermas, the Age of Enlightenment had three important achievements: rationalism, individualism, and secularism. But according to Giddens, modernity is more than a philosophical view. It has social, economic, and political dimensions (Adorno-Herkhaim, 2007: 42).

Political sociology is a branch of sociology that analyzes political dynamics in the form of sociology and terms of the dynamics of political behavior. It is influenced by social dynamics such as cooperation, competition, conflict, social mobility, public opinion, the transfer of power between groups, and all the dynamics that are somehow influential in political behavior. (Shayanmehr, 2009: 195). In general, the subject of political sociology is, on the one hand, the study of the relationship between the state, political power, and state power, and on the other hand, society, social power of social forces and groups. In simpler terms, in political sociology, political life is explained by social variables (Bashiriyeh, 2007: 18). Thus, if we take the clergy as a criterion by reading the jurisprudence of political Islam, it is obvious that this force has played a role in the last hundred years as an influential social force in the equations of religion and government. The important point in the discussion of this social force is that in 1979, using the leadership of Imam Khomeini and benefiting from the Shiite school of reason and principles, it was able to take new concepts from the Western world and combine them with traditional Shiite teachings based on the authority of reason and *ijtihad*. Theorize these concepts on time and place, and present political jurisprudence against other discourses such as right-left Islamists, intellectuals, nationalists, and right-left secularists, and eventually become a hegemonic discourse in a discourse contest. With these descriptions, to provide an objective example of this fact, entering the field of thinking and being a philosophical analyst, how in the field of social life, how to deal and the level of confrontation of some thinkers with crises and political and social issues in the field and on the other hand, due to the importance of the issue of the West and Western civilization, it is necessary to mention this issue in an independent axis.

In Iran, these efforts have been made in response to the adoption of specific positions on the new culture and civilization. But a brief look at the political history of contemporary Iran brings to mind that political Islam jurisprudence is not compatible with Western civilization or modernity and seeks to reject it. Why political-jurisprudential Islam did not intend to accept modernity can be the main question of this research. What are the obstacles and problems of confronting Islamic jurisprudence based on traditional principles with modernity? It seems that the incomplete understanding of traditional political jurisprudence of the logic of modernity and the concern for the rule of modernity values have caused a confrontation between the two currents. The answer of modern governments to this question was yes. This positive response legitimized the need to adopt specific socio-cultural policies for the formation of today's nation. This also required cultural and identity homogenization. Thus, most cultural policies are historically rooted in

government protectionist policies, which are typically adopted and implemented to design national power or state power, or for national identity or national unity (Sing, 2018: 17).

Under such circumstances, cultural policy was structural for all nations. The differences between states and nations in this regard are more related to differences in how their political systems intervene in the field of culture than to their involvement or non-intervention (Fazeli, & Qelich, 2013: 15).

In the discussion of the relationship between religion or clergy and the government in different periods, all the authors' efforts have been to prove the official and oriented view, which has become popular mainly in Iran after the 1979 revolution. Of course, there were people before this date, but his view alone cannot explain the reality of the relationship between the political clergy and different governments in different eras. The most important issue in the background of this research is that so far, due to the researcher's practices, the research that can comprehensively present the historical contradictions of jurisprudential political Islam with modernity has not been obtained. However, the following works can be effective in strengthening the theoretical support of this article. The study by Elgar (2003) examined the role of religious clerics in creating a constitutional revolution and tried to motivate them to get excited against the government for insulting religious clerics in the issue of Belgian Noz, the issue of hanging a religious cleric in Kerman. The issue is attributed to the beating of sugar traders, as well as competition between themselves and the assassination of Seyyed Abdolmajid, and so on. The author of the book *Religion and Government in Iran* continues to critique the aforementioned cases. Paying attention to the design of these materials and his critique creates in the minds of the readers the impression that the clergy and the authorities of imitation have risen up against colonialism but have not benefited much from modernity and constitutionalism. Taghizadeh, (2009) in the book *Iranian Science and Modernity* wants to answer the question of what is the relationship between Iranian science and modernity. In response to the question of what to do, Azadarmaki counts three possible answers. We have been and remain a backward nation, so there is nothing we can do and the best thing to do is to act inappropriately. That force may be Eastern, Western, or supernatural. The third category of responses insists that we must pursue the problem within the structure of our society and explore and find the cause. Dr. Azad belongs to this third category. He emphasizes the changes of "science" and "culture" in recent centuries in Iran. He believes that this view of Iranian society is a new one. Aiatmozafari (2009) in his book "Relations between the clergy and the government in contemporary Iran" deals with the relationship between religion and government from 1961 to 1979. Also, it contains the multifaceted relations of the clergy with the government and the complexities that existed in this relationship in this period. In this book, he does not deal with the role and activities of the parties and religious forces opposed to the Shah's regime in the detailed way that is required. Frati (2015) in the book "Clergy and Politics: Issues and Consequences" deals with the pathology of clergy and politics. This work seeks to answer the question of what functions and structure the clergy has and what are the consequences for the function and organization of the clergy. Shahbazi (2015) in the book "Religion and Government in Political Thought" shows that neither the history of Iran has been Zoroastrian since the beginning and the monotheism of Zoroastrian religion from the beginning has been seriously questioned by scholars nor the government in the history of ancient Iran had such authority and power and Democracy did not exist in ancient Greece in the modern sense, but ancient Greek society had a tribal structure based on multiple gods. This book aims to explore the theory of the "religious center" of which Mr. Dostdar is its most important processor. But the issue is beyond Mr. Dostdar's specific point of view. In this study, the fundamental concepts that underlie our political thought are reviewed and to some extent address the content of many contemporary Iranian intellectual debates.

2. Methodology

This research will try to discuss the ideas of jurisprudential political Islam by discourse methodology.

3. Findings

By finding the central sign and its examples, consequently in a metaphorical space that is the bedrock of hostilities with other people. First, how the continuity of their discourses works and then, their effects in terms of legitimation or delegitimation, the function, effect of their discourse language on the intellectual and political actions of Iranian society should be interpreted. Since the most important issues of political-jurisprudential Islam have been the emphasis on concepts and meanings, in their signifiers against the central and floating signifiers, we have highlighted modernity as a discourse around which the central signifier has gathered signs. And the credibility for the maturing status of the traditional era. This in itself has a product called how to refuse technology. This product has been considered as the most important opposition of these two currents of thought and through it, they create an identity for their meanings and continuity for these two anti-Western discourses against Iranian modernists. This is the most important argument in this study based on the method of discourse analysis as the contrast between the two discourses of political-jurisprudential Islam with the discourse of modernity. In other words, this issue is considered as the most important axis of this research as the roots of the conflict between political and jurisprudential Islam and modernity.

The school of contradiction

Sociologists unanimously attribute the emergence of the school and theories of conflict to Karl Marx, George Simmel, and Max Weber (Turner, 2002). In developing the conflict theory, Marx proposed a conception of social organization that still influences much of contemporary sociological theories. Simmel, like Marx, sees conflict in society as pervasive and inevitable but shows a conception of social organization different from what Marx emphasized. Social relations occur in an orderly context that can only take the form of an organic fusion of continuous and discrete processes. These processes are a reflection of the instinctual stimuli of the actors and the orders expressed by various examples of social relations. Thus, the conflict processes are a pervasive feature of the social system but do not necessarily lead to the collapse of the system or social change in all cases. Conflict is one of the main processes in operation to induce the whole system or part of its components (Turner, 2002: 162). Although Max Weber criticized Marx's theory of contradiction, like Marx, he believed that contradiction was an inevitable aspect of social relations. He believed the emergence of benevolent leaders was due to social contradictions and ultimately incited the people against the ruling classes. Marx, Simmel, and Weber's different conflict theories have led contemporary contradictory theorists to focus on the conflict in different ways since the 1960s. Contemporary conflict theorists each sought out one or more of the early anti-conflict professors. Kozer defines conflict as follows: Conflicting behavior with an opponent over scarce interests requires neutralizing, harming, or eliminating the opponent. According to him, the causes of conflict are the deprivation of groups deprived of the distribution of the scarce resources in society. In this regard, he states that: The more the deprived groups question the legitimacy of the distribution of available scarce resources. Conflict is more likely to start (Kozer, 2010: 8). Regarding the severity of the conflict, it is believed that the more the conditions that cause the conflict are known, the more severe the conflict becomes. Also, the more emotionally involved people conflict, the more intense the conflict becomes. Kozer was the first person after Simmel to place great emphasis on conflicting functions. In his view, conflict can have both positive and negative functions for the cohesion and unity of a social organization.

Finally, about the persistence of the conflict, Kozer believes that the broader and more ambiguous the goals of the opposition groups in the conflict, the longer the conflict. Conversely, the more limited and clear the goals, the shorter the conflict will be.

In this hybrid causal model, Turner lists the nine causal sequences as follows:

- The social system consists of interdependent units.
- In the system of unequal distribution of valuable and scarce resources between interdependent units.
- Restoration of legitimacy by units that have not received a proper share of scarce resources.
- Gaining initial knowledge about the objective benefits in the system of changing the distribution of scarce resources.
- Emotional stimulation of deprivation.
- Irregular emergence of a period of despair.
- Increasing the intensity of emotional involvement of the deprived unit in conflict.
- Trying to organize conflict groups among deprived units.
- Revealing the violent conflict between deprived and privileged units (Turner, 2002: 96).

Modernity and modernism

Modernity means novelty and freshness, which was first used in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the 18th century and later became common in the works of many writers of that era.

Modernity in the term is a kind of state and quality, feature and modern experience, which expresses the innovation and novelty of the present as a break or disconnection from the past, and entering the "future" that is emerging, and its scope is associated with the idea of innovation, initiative, novelty, creativity, pioneering, progress, development, growth, evolution, taste and fashion. Modernism means new movement. The term refers to ideas and ways of life or social organization that have replaced traditional ideas and ways and include all aspects of life, both individual and social.

The tendency towards modernity means what is new, modern, and contemporary. In other words, to prefer a new idea or method over a traditional and old idea and method and to give it originality and validity. The word modern is derived from the Latin word *modernus*, which is itself derived from the word "*medo*". The word means recently. The Romans are said to have used the word "modern" in the late fifth century to refer to new skeptical values and beliefs that were opposed to old accepted beliefs and were interpreted as anti-Q. An example of this is the writings of the Roman politician and historian Casio Doros, who lived in the first half of the sixth century AD. He uses the words "anti-Q and modern" to express the opposition to new and old values (Ahmadi, 1994: 5). In fact, "modernity" is a complex concept that cannot be comprehensively defined. The difficulty of defining the word "modern" is due to the fact that this word is always in conflict with two other concepts: one is the concept of "old" and the other is the concept of "tradition". In this sense, the passage of time is constantly changing the meaning of the word "modern"; but the principle of "modernity" means "always moving forward" and at the same time "calling the new" and discarding the "old". For the Romans, the word "modern" meant "new"; whereas the meaning of "ancient" was "what belongs to the past." (Jahanbagloo, 2010: 55).

How Reza Shah tends to modernity

Reza Khan's trip to Turkey in the summer of 1934 and his association with Atatürk greatly influenced him. Following this trip, fundamental changes and measures took place in the field of the social situation in Iran, and Reza Shah seriously undertook fundamental changes and transformations in Iranian society. He rejected the cultural and religious values and patterns of Iranian society and tried to bring western behavioral and moral patterns and values into Iran. This trend continued during the reign of Mohammad Reza and the patterns of western society became widespread in Iranian society. In such a situation, a kind of biculturalism became prevalent in Iranian society. In the culture and ethics of the upper and affluent classes of society, reading western novels and installing images of western artists and heroes in homes and halls was a sign of renewal and progress, and what was religious and Iranian in color and national culture was a sign of backwardness. Gaziorovaki, (1995: 407) believes that "as much as the new upper and middle classes became Westernized and their behavior was different from Iranian and Islamic values, the traditional lower and middle classes, the royal family and the upper class were considered immoral and un-Islamic. As a

result of this situation, there was a growing gap and conflict between the values and social habits of the modern and westernized part and the traditional parts of Iran. "This alienated the traditional section from the new section of society." According to Foko, the modernization of Iranian society is a thing of the past. In fact, with this statement, he refers to the process of importing this phenomenon and its so-called imitation and pseudo-modernism in Iran. Pseudo-modernism arose from a kind of cultural insight that saw the solution of backward countries as mere imitation of the west. Intellectuals who knew the root of backwardness in traditionalism recommended taking western industry and culture together. The model of pseudo-modernism was based on two principles: a) The rejection of all indigenous and Islamic traditions, institutions and values that were the cause of backwardness and the source of national humiliation. B) The superficial desire and emotional excitement of a small but expanding group from urban society to acquire the appearances of the modern world (Khoshrouzadeh, 2010: 50). In general, one aspect of this pseudo-modernism is the unthinking and non-critical application of theories, methods, techniques, and ideals derived from the experience of developed countries (here Turkey) that western theorists use in the study of third world countries. In fact, in the process, many third world intellectuals and political leaders voluntarily fall prey to a superficial conception of European modernism known as "pseudo-modernism."

The pseudo-modernism of the third world was the result of modernism. Thus, the pseudo-modernism of the third world has, at the same time, accumulated a real disregard for the nature of European modernism, a disregard for the indigenous features of the third world, and a lack of sufficient knowledge of western scientific and social developments and their scope, requirements, and origins. In the pseudo-modernism model, modern technology is known as the definitive and miraculous cure, and it is thought that it can solve all social and economic problems once purchased and installed. That is why social values and traditional and religious institutions, as Reza Shah thought, are in fact the causes of backwardness and the source of social shame, and conversely, the industrialization and installation of the modern steel factory is not a means but an end in itself. Katouzian, 1999: 147). Some believe that "Reza Shah's government was the first modern absolute government in Iran and although some of its features were rooted in the past, a new political system was going to you" (Bashiriyeh, 2003: 68). He formed his modern government by concentrating the resources and tools of power, creating national unity, establishing a modern army, weakening dispersed centers of power, forcible resettlement, and disarmament of nomads, establishing new bureaucracies and financial reforms, and concentrating administrative resources. Also, some believe that 1927 is the beginning of the domination of pseudo-modernism in Iran (Katouzian, 2000: 147). The definition of "quasi-modernism" also refers to a superficial understanding of European modernism, which includes features such as lack of knowledge of European scientific and social developments and its scope, limits, requirements, and how it originated (The same). In other words, from this date, a kind of authoritarian modernization began in Iran, and the government played a key role in this regard. The bureaucracy and the army were organized according to Western patterns. "Germany's national economic guidance model was modeled, and the country's industrialization and support for domestic industries became the main goal of government programs."

Reza Shah's cultural policies are also based on formalism (denial of manifestations of diversity and pluralism through intentional and formal imitation, change of appearances, uniforming of people and rejection of hijab), promotion of antiquity and extremist Iranianism, denial of Islamic manifestations, reduction The power of the clergy through changes in the educational and judicial system, reducing the number of clerical representatives in parliament, imposing restrictions on the use of pulpits, mosques, clerical clothing, endowments and holding religious rites, using official insults and rumors, severe censorship of news and information, Closing non-Persian publications, changing the educational system from home to the western system, closing religious minority schools, changing the music system in a circular and eliminating national and Iranian music, and replacing Western music, especially inspired by the Baladieh Orchestra Turkey was the period of Atatürk (Maghsoudi, 2002: 33). Reza Shah, through the

"Enlightenment Circle of Public Opinion" established in the Ministry of Education in the late 1930s, sought to propagate his modernist ideas.

"During public lectures by well-known experts and professional men, the organization covers a wide range of issues and topics, including ethics, history, health, literature, social sciences, education, modernity and It discusses patriotism, loyalty to the Shah, and mentioning the prominent progress of the country in recent years" (Fouran, 2015: 339). In other words, during this period, the Europeanization of customs and socialization was considered the most central goal. However, the government had placed this measure in the line of industrialization and technical development of the country. Due to this perception, Iran soon became one of the consumer societies in which the market for food, clothing, and other tools of European life became very hot. Due to this, the traditional and religious society of the time tended to the tendencies of the West, and then political, cultural, and religious developments took place in Iran. Meanwhile, the religious community and the clergy confronted the actions and policies of Reza Shah, which are generally discussed in this study.

The position and role of the clergy in Iran

The Shiite clergy has been the main focus of many intellectual, cultural, and political developments in Iran. That is why many tyrannical kings and rulers, in order to achieve their goals, have tried to treat the great religious and clerical authorities in a way that does not endanger their position. This characteristic of the Iranian people's religion and the power of the clergy, which stems from the teachings of the Shiites and the sanctification of the clergy, has led the people, most of whom are Shiite Muslims, to follow them in all matters. The first serious signs of the active presence of the clergy in the political arena of contemporary Iranian history can be clearly seen in the case of the tobacco embargo and the events leading up to the constitutional movement. One of the things that give special power to Shiite clerics is their economic independence. The source of this economic independence is zakat and etc., which are paid to the clergy according to Shiite jurisprudence and the government does not receive a share from them. Although the Pahlavi regime in the last decades of its rule increasingly tried to reduce their influence among the people and prevent their activities, this attempt was unsuccessful and finally, the Islamic Revolution showed that the Shah's regime was very unsuccessful in this area (Halidi, 2007: 228). The most influential and respected class among the people is the clergy. This class has had an important impact on socio-political developments among the masses of people and different social strata in terms of the deep connection of people with religion.

This fact is evident in the political culture and revolutionary struggles of the Iranian nation. The power of Shiite clerics, which arose from the influence of religion in various strata of society and gained legitimacy, was not limited to specific religious issues, but in the post-Islamic history of Iran, their ever-increasing presence in decision-making, leadership, and we have witnessed participation in revolutionary movements.

In addition to the deep connection of the people with religion, which has been one of the effective factors in the high position of the clergy among the people, other conditions are also involved. The clergy, for example, has always been a haven for the people to sue and a refuge for those pursued by government rulings, and the influence of their rhetoric and fatwas has always been the source of local and national uprisings that have changed the course of their routine (Elgar, 2003: 74).

The positions of the clergy against the actions of Reza Shah Pahlavi

Iranian clerics are divided into three groups of silent clerics, those who believe in cooperating with the government, and the third group of anti-government clerics, based on how they take their scientific positions against the government and their relations with the king and the court. "The positions taken by each of the different groups against the government, whose intensity and weakness were different and varied in different circumstances, had different natures, causes and motives" (Ajoudani, 2008: 18), but if there is a difference of opinion or procedural difference between the clergy There was great, in adopting

the method and type of struggle against tyranny and colonialism, not in principle. Some, such as Haj Agha Noorullah Esfahani, believed in harsh and shocking behavior, and some, such as Mirza Naeini (after returning from exile), did not consider the treatment of the first Pahlavi to be very effective and expedient at that point in history, and promoted reform goals through They knew peace was possible (Najafi, 2003: 260). In Iran during the constitutional era and after that, the period when Reza Shah came to power, the situation was such that due to its special geography, it has rugged areas, mountain ranges, deserts, long distances between cities, infertile land, lack of rain and lack of water resources caused the population to be scattered in small, isolated units such as remote villages, isolated cities, and nomadic tribes (Abrahamian, 2010: 22). This situation in Iran creates a serious need to establish communication and transportation networks. According to Abrahamian, there were no vehicles in the country, mules and camels were in fact the usual means of transportation (Abrahamian, 2010: 18). The pioneers of the modernization process in Iran were Abbas Mirza, Crown Prince of Fath Ali Shah, Mirza Issa or Mirza Bozorg (First Deputy) and his son Mirza Abolghasem, Deputy Farahani; Who started the renovation from above. The Iranian constitutional movement during the Qajar period, as a movement showing progress in the process of modernization from below, was possible only through the formation of a coalition between the three forces of intellectuals, businessmen and the traditional, modern and middle classes, as well as the clergy. The clergy mainly took the lead in the movement, and merchants, traditional and modern middle classes provided the manpower, logistical needs, and organizational facilities required for the movement. The Iranian constitutional movement was one of the first constitutionalist movements in Eastern societies, which marked the beginning of the process of social, cultural and political modernization with the aim of eliminating absolute and authoritarian power. In the first Pahlavi era, although modernization can be seen as Western and authoritarian, the performance of clerics and intellectuals in this period is still worth considering. In terms of social, economic and political affiliations, the clergy are in different groups, and their reaction to modernization can be analyzed accordingly. "After removing the claimants to power and forming a central power, Reza Shah decided to turn Iran into a republican system and dismantle the monarchy. Ataturk's model was intended. But in Iran, various factors, including the stubborn opposition of the clergy and the opposition of some of Reza Khan's critics, prevented the realization of the republican plan. Some Iranian clerics had observed the weakening of religious leaders in Turkey and the Soviet Union. They feared that Reza Khan's customary republic would face a similar fate. For this reason, they opposed the idea of a republic. Reza Khan also surrendered to the clergy without much resistance and thought of a kingdom instead of the Republic of Iran (Milani, 2012: 27-26). The scholars in this section can be divided into four categories according to their position, and in this series of discussions, their positions will be examined case by case. In these discussions, we seek to explain each of Reza Khan's positions and then to recount the positions of religious currents in relation to each period. However, regarding the reaction of the clergy to Reza Khan's position at the beginning, it should be said that if we want to divide the clergy in terms of their position in the face of Reza Khan's initial claims after coming to power, it should be categorized as follows:

- 1- The constitutionalist clerics who agreed for a while and were optimistic about Reza Khan's slogans.
- 2- Clerics who were opposed from the beginning and did not have a sharp political struggle, but expressed their opposition, such as Ayatollah Shahabadi and the late Mr. Bafghi.
- 3- A group of clerics who were opposed, but their field of activity was cultural and religious activity, and they did not enter the political field much.
- 4- Clerics who are not associated with the government and there is no open opposition from them and their activities are more focused on the expression of rulings and their activities are even different from cultural activities (With this statement, the account of Hajj Sheikh and Sheikh Abbas Qomi should be separated from this fourth category. Although some people consider the third and fourth categories to be the same, there seem to be some differences). A clear example of this group is Aghazadeh Khorasani (son of Akhund Khorasani). He does not quarrel with Reza Khan, but when he was asked about the discovery of

hijab, whether it is necessary for you to cover woman's face or not, He says: I am a mujtahid and in this regard I say that in my opinion it is necessary. When he says this, he has stated the Shari'a ruling and expressed his ijtehad opinion, but he is arrested and brought to Tehran in a bad situation. Of course, the government's excuse was that he was involved in the Goharshad affair, while he had no involvement. Later, that tradition remained in their family.

The main reasons for the confrontation between traditional Islamic jurisprudence and modernity

The most important thinkers of this view are Daniel Pipes, Bernard Lewis, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. Oppositionists believe that there are intellectual and philosophical contradictions between Islam and the West. Hence, one can never reconcile Islamic teachings with Western ideas. For example, Bernard Lewis in his famous work *Islam and the West* examines the fact that there is no compatibility between Islam and democracy and that the philosophical and identity gap between Islam and the West cannot be filled. According to him, the main reasons for Islamists being anti-Western and anti-American are their feelings of inferiority, jealousy and fear of the West. Finding the root of the problem, Lewis says, the intensity of Islamists' anti-Western sentiments stems from the fact that the United States, as the legal heir to European civilization and the undisputed leader of the West, has inherited the gaps, and has become a hotbed of hatred and anger. More importantly, Lewis believes that Islam and democracy are inherently incompatible. Hence, political Islamists can never behave democratically (Lewis, 1993: 61-91). Samuel Huntington, a professor of political science at Harvard University, also believes that Islam is inherently undemocratic. "The only Arab country to experience a form of democracy over a relatively long two decades was Christian Lebanon," he wrote. However, Lebanese democracy collapsed when Muslims gained a majority (Huntington, 2008: 78). Huntington believes that the struggle between Islam and the West is not just about political and material interests, but about the clash of cultures and civilizations. In other words, Huntington believes that the challenge between Islam and the West is not merely a political, ideological and economic challenge, but a cultural and civilizational challenge that exists between the values of Western civilization and the values of Islamic civilization. Richard Rubenstein and Jarrell Crocker, in their analysis of Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations, write: "For Huntington, in the end, what matters to people is not economic or ideological interests, but religious, family, blood ties, beliefs, and other things that people know, fight for, and fight for." They are killed, and that is why the clash of civilizations as a phenomenon at the center of world politics replaces the Cold War" (Rubenstein & Crocker, 2008: 255). According to Huntington, this challenge, which is essentially a challenge to cultural identity, is exacerbated by the backwardness of Islamic societies and the progress of the West. He emphasizes that the West's efforts to promote its values, namely democracy and liberalism as universal values, and to maintain its military superiority and advance its economic interests, provoke retaliatory reactions from other civilizations, including Islam. In this sense, the war between Islamic civilization and Christian civilization will be inevitable (Huntington, 2008: 79). But among the proponents of the confrontational view, the most vocal is Daniel Pipes. Like Lewis, he argues that "Islamists' anti-Western tendencies are rooted in their historical hatred of Christianity and Western values" (Pipes, 1994: 63). According to Pipes, during the Cold War, Islamism was the main threat to Western civilization. According to him, Islamists make up a small part of the Muslim world and their number is about ten percent of the Muslim population. But he describes the number as very dangerous, which is why he calls them the new communism. Pipes goes even further, declaring that political Islam is the number one enemy of liberal democracy. According to him, political Islamists have replaced communism in enmity with the West. According to Pipes, Islamists compare the past glory of Islamic civilization with the poverty and backwardness of today's Islamic societies and believe that today's misery is due to the influence of the West in the Islamic world (Pipes, 1994: 63). Pipes also believes that the Islamists offer a radical interpretation of their situation and seek to destroy the West, so the West must wage a full-scale war against the Islamists and ultimately defeat them. In this sense, Pipes sees violence as inherent in Islam and believes that it is impossible to reform them, so the West must destroy the Islamists¹. In short, the oppositionists consider

¹ Of course, years before Huntington articulated his hypothesis, Bernard Lewis had said: The future struggle is nothing but the clash of civilizations. That is, the probably irrational but certainly historical reaction of an ancient rival, against our Judeo-Christian heritage, against our secular status and against the universal expansion of the two (Georges: 2003: 54-53). What leads the oppositionists to this conclusion is not only the perceptions and attitudes that exist in the West, but also a large part of the reasons for the theories and theoretical approaches of some prominent Islamist figures about political Islam. Islamic figures such

the enmity between Islam and the West as historical and believe that contemporary political Islamists have emerged from such a historical rivalry. They consider Islam to be a war-monger and believe that Islamists will wage a full-scale war against Western cultural values if they gain political power in Muslim societies. They believe that Islam has nothing to do with liberal universal values and therefore will not oppose political Islam, and believe that the next world war will be a war between civilizations. They argue that because of the philosophical, military, and economic superiority of Western modernity over Islamists in the impending war between civilizations, it is a victory for Western liberal democracy, and Islamists are doomed. The group believes that eventually Western values will permeate and political Islam, like communism and other ideologies, will fail. Francis Fukuyama's theory supports this claim. "What we are witnessing is not only the end of the Cold War or the passing of a special historical stage, but also the end of history, the turning point of which is the ideological evolution and universality of Western liberal democracy as the last," he said in an article entitled "The End of History." (Fukuyama, 1989: 18). Regardless of the period of reflection and flourishing of Islamic movements in Muslim lands unilaterally, he considers the decline and defeat of communist ideology in the formation of the world utopia as the victory of Western ideology and profession. In general, the oppositionists characterize the characteristics of political Islam as follows: advocating a return to the basic principles of the school of Islam, opposition to interpretation and strict adherence to sacred words and texts, militant and absolutist behavior, trying to reconcile Sharia with social issues and implementation of Sharia in any way (politicization), inability to go beyond their cultural space and consider themselves superior, opposition to feminism and imitation in religion, emphasis on the Islamization of all aspects of civilization (Nazari, 1387: 324).

Activism of the discourse of political Islam in the Islamic world and the international system

The secular evaluation of political Islam has important implications for the international system. In secular analysis, political Islam is seen as the intellectual, scientific and industrial backwardness of Muslim societies. Thus, violence and prejudice based on identity is its inherent characteristic and is therefore equated with fundamentalism. According to Onder Weir and Elman, when religion becomes political, it is interpreted as conceptualizing fundamentalism and almost as a negative social force that goes against science, rationality, secularism, and, in short, against modernity (Hurd, 2007: 3). Political Islam is defined as a threat to the status of the private scope and as a step towards religious rule. This hypothetical transgression is often linked in expression to Muslims' inclination to terrorism and totalitarianism (McAlister, 2001; 220). For example, a recent report by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament called on the British government to be more careful in defining political Islam and to recognize that many movements influenced by political Islam (including the Brotherhood) Muslims) have the same values as Britain. Accordingly, the British government should not have a single approach to the phenomenon of political Islam, and should distinguish between its democratic and liberal approaches, and its extremist and impatient approaches. Another political consequence of secularist epistemology is that in contemporary Islamic societies, there is no distinction between the public and private spheres, sacred and customary, Islam and politics, and it does not appear at all, or it appears as an inappropriate imitation of the Western secular ideal. This heterogeneous approach presents a vague and confusing picture of political

as Seyyed Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, Rashid Reza, and Mawdudi have come up with ideas that can be expressed in the context of radical views, and Western writers have referred to them in drawing a radical view of political Islam. For example, Seyyed Qutb, in his famous book called "Landmarks on the way", strongly opposes any idea of the rule of the people. In his view, such a government has usurped God's sovereignty and is essentially authoritarian. Because it makes a person obedient to other people. According to Qutb, when some human beings legislate for others, true equality and human dignity are not achieved. According to him, the Islamic system is ignorant and the solution of Muslims against them is "jihad". According to him, "jihad" is a constant conflict between the Islamic system and all models of contemporary ignorance. Abul-Ali Maududi, the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami movement in Pakistan and a supporter of Sayyid Qutb, pursues his radical arguments that true Islam is a revolutionary ideology that seeks to transform the social order around the world and rebuild it according to its own ideas and principles.

Islam in the world, paving the way for its rejection and any eliminatory approach. On the other hand, especially after 9/11, the discourse of political Islam is known by conflicting terms, as opposed to secularist discourses. This confrontation has a more security approach. In this security approach, political Islam is considered a dangerous and chaotic phenomenon in the international system with which there is no possibility of political and cultural reconciliation and the only way to deal with this phenomenon is war and its destruction. The highlighting of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other Takfiri groups, along with the terrorist addressing of anti-Israel Islamic movements, can be seen in this context. But it must be borne in mind that the discourse of political Islam in the logic of the existence of international relations and in general, in the existing structure of the international system, has dimensions due to two factors. First, the unequal distribution of power in the contemporary international system, which provides opportunities for the great powers to intervene in the Islamic world with the aim of advancing their goals. The second factor, which is somewhat a by-product of the first, is the close relationship between the great powers, especially the United States, and the repressive and authoritarian regimes of the Islamic world. These two factors are inextricably linked to the political anti-regime forces of many Islamist movements within Islamic countries and their anti-hegemonic situation worldwide (Thompson & Reuveny, 2008; 169). Accordingly, the discourse of political Islam cannot be improvised in opposition to conventional secularist concepts and other separatist discourses, the separation of religion and politics. The discourse of political Islam is not a unified threat to international norms and global security. Rather, political Islam is the emergence of a discourse tradition, in different ways and with different outcomes and consequences, and ranges from radical and anti-democratic Islamists to democratic and secular Islamists.

Confrontation with the West

The end of the nineteenth century marks a turning point in the thought of modernity in the Islamic world. From now on, modernism does not mean borrowing from the West to react to the decline of the East, but it does mean putting a special Islamic modernity in front of the West (Badie, 2001: 86). This stage was critical and groundbreaking. This situation shows the frustration and despair of Muslims of the contemporary era and civilization. At this stage, a special Islamic-civilizational model was proposed in various social and political fields. According to this model, Islam does not recognize class and ethnic challenges. Islam is not democracy or socialism, but it offers the world a unique model of society and politics that goes beyond the materialism and evil of contemporary civilization. Abu al-Ali Maududi declared in the 1940s that Islam was a distinct, pervasive, and abrogated religion of Shari'a and a unit between civilizations, and that it was not possible to establish a mixed religious system in the Indian subcontinent. The Muslims must either regain control of India or form their own government. The Almighty God says: "And whoever does not judge by what God has revealed, those are the unbelievers" (Al-Ma'ida / 44). So, the question goes back to the root of who is the ruler? Who owns the model? Who is the decision maker? The answer to all this is with God, in which case the system is the system of God, Islam and faith, or the ruling is that of tyranny, in which case, this system is the system of tyranny, immorality, misguidance and infidelity. According to Mawdudi, Islam is the abrogator of the religions before and after it and dominates all of them and has no more than two states: either it becomes the ruler and dominator on the earth or it takes root and excels in a region and its base Strengthens and is ready to rise and dominate and expand and has no middle ground. Islam is not democracy and liberalism. Islam is not constitutionalism or nationalism. Islam is Islam alone, and Muslims must decide whether to be pure Muslims and not associate partners with God, or to avoid confronting the world over Islam and the requirements of their faith, and to take a middle position. That is, they should be neither pure Muslims nor tyranny. Tyranny exists in contemporary civilization and in Western civilization, which has overpowered Western man with its seditions and techniques, enslaving him and throwing its cultural and political strings towards Muslims in order to destroy their religion. So much so that they give up their belief and lose their sovereignty and enter a system of pervasive slavery that sometimes in the name of the law of civilization and sometimes in the

name of the new international system spreads its trap all over the world (Rezvan, 2005: 20). This stage was associated with World War II and its enormous losses, the Cold War and the division of the world into capitalist and communist blocs, the establishment of the Zionist regime in the Palestinian territories and the fall of liberal and pro-Western regimes in Islamic societies. In addition to the criticisms of modern civilization by Western thinkers, Muslim intellectuals who had previously written and thought about the liberality of Islam and its contemporaneity with contemporary civilization, began to establish a critical tendency and contemporary civilization and showing the prominence and distinction of Islam towards it. Transformation from intellectual and political convergence with the West, modernization and familiarization of Islam with the West and efforts to reconcile Islam with Western civilization in all matters, with the aim of fundamentally criticizing the West for its undesirable achievements and products of Western civilization and extreme, inhuman materialism And the immorality of this civilization, the two bloody world wars, the use of the atomic bomb that was a threat to all of humanity, the support of military dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and the disregard for the fall of Arab and Islamic liberal regimes to counter the influence of communism. Such an atmosphere raised doubts among Muslim thinkers about the advanced and civilized nature of the West. Islamic writings despised Marxism and capitalism, and sought to establish an Islamic, ideological, and political model for confronting other old and new models, civilizations, and systems. This was possible for them. Because in the seventh century AD, when the two great and materialistic empires (Byzantium and Iran) ruled the world, it was able to offer a new model in the name of God to the world and destroy the Iranian empire, and after centuries of struggle, it To disintegrate the other and thus create a new time and place, as a result of which man will be freed from the bondage of slaves and transferred to the worship of God. In the eyes of these elites, this was the current task of Islam. That is, to design its only divine model and to establish an alternative civilization, neither Eastern nor Western. Thus, Abul Hassan Nadavi, an Indian Muslim who preached pure and comprehensive Islam and far from violence, warned in a 1957 book published in Arabic that there were "Western ideas" that were on the way to domination. It is on the whole world, including the Islamic world, and an "Islamic idea" must be prepared that can face this idea of atmospheric, dominant and creeping superiority. With the translation of Mawdudi's works into Arabic in the 1950s and 1960s, the concept of divine sovereignty found a special place in the discourse of political Islam. Seyyed Qutb wrote the book "Teachers in the Road" in 1964 on the face of Islamic culture with contemporary challenges. Relying on the critical legacy of Islamist writers of the 1940s and 1950s, especially Mawdudi and Nadavi, he considers it possible to judge the situation of Muslims with this fundamental question from the intellectual origin of the idea of "divine sovereignty" as the backbone of the Islamic model and the specific identity of Islam. Who rules in the field of thought, culture, politics and government? God or tyranny? Everything except Islam is ignorance, misguidance and tyranny. God says so, the Qur'an says so, and the prophets says so, the crossroads of Islam's challenges with internal misguided and external enemies throughout history. Sayyid Qutb, in response to the question of the claimants and rulers of the Islamists about their cultural and political programs, says: "Our program is divine, Quranic and prophetic, and you have all ruled over us without a plan, philosophy, and only through rebellion and tyranny." Soon we will come to power and you will see what plan and philosophy we have for the government. But before that, we do not waste ourselves and our opportunity by mentioning details and entering into challenges that are common only for the benefit of ignorance. "Today's societies are all ignorant and non-Islamic, and it is fair to say frankly and fearlessly that Islam has nothing to do with everything that is happening on the planet today; Because sovereignty is not Islam and the only alternative to this false situation is, first and foremost, to establish an Islamic society that has made Islam its Shari'a and does not reject any other Shari'a. Dealing with the ignorant society requires a degree of power, the power of belief and imagination, the power of morality and self-improvement, the power of social organization and other types of power that can help the ignorant society, such as the power of perseverance and the power to overcome such a society "(Rezvan, 2005: 35). This passage from Seyyed Qutb's book, Landmarks on the way, contains two basic and common theoretical ideas that are the origin of

militant groups. Those two ideas are the idea of ignorance and the idea of sovereignty. Because according to this theory, the world today, which includes the world of Islam, is like pre-Islamic ignorance. According to Sayyid Qutb, according to the meaning of the word "La ilaha illa Allah" and what is stated in the Qur'an that "the rule belongs only to God" (Yusuf / 40); "Creation and command belong to God alone" (Al-A'raf / 54), "Do they want the rule of ignorance?" And who is better than God for a people who believe? (Al-Ma'idah / 50), what is found in the world today is the rule of man and human heresies against the divinity and the rule and law of God. Therefore, a believing minority must rise up and consciously renounce the values and ideas of ignorance and purify their deeds for God, until their deeds are organized. They will fall on ignorance and destroy their buildings fortress by fortress and restore the rule of God to the earth. These are the things that Seyyed Qutb wrote in prison and after his release in 1964. The purpose of Islamic cultural efforts at this stage was to develop signs of an Islamic model in the face of the "civilization of the age of error." But this misguided civilization was not a foreign and threatening thing, but in the form of ways of thinking and political system, it had to change from clashing with an unknown foreign enemy to confronting the dominant domestic tyranny. Because if Islam had not mastered culture and politics, it could no longer have a place in Islamic lands. At this stage, the Islamists rejected the passivity towards the West under the pretext of its advanced and civilized nature and turned to its implementation inside the Islamic lands. Therefore, it is true that Islam is a universal system, but its universality does not mean accepting new material misguidances and unrestrained, but first it must show its distinction and prominence in its realm so that all the worlds are at their peak. And observe the distinction of this pattern, and by observing this pattern, revolt against the servitude of materiality imposed on them (Rezvan, 2005: 23). There are many historical, social and economic reasons for calling for an Islamic government, which Muhammad Saeed al-Ashmawi, a contemporary Arab intellectual, has summarized in the following eleven cases:

The history of colonialism, the history of confrontation between the West (first in Europe and then in Europe and America) and the East (Middle East) to the fourth century BC, Alexander's wars with Egypt, Syria and Persia, which in the second century BC. The Roman Empire replaced the Greek forces. In the Christian era, this conflict took on a religious form and continued for seven centuries with the rise of Islam and Islamic conquests in Egypt, Syria, North Africa, and the conquest of Andalusia. From the 11th to the 13th century AD, the Crusades (1095-1291) were fought between the Christian West and the Muslims, which had many negative effects on both sides. This conflict continued with the victories of the Ottoman Turks in Asia Minor, Greece and the Balkan Peninsula, and then in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries AD, with the conquest, occupation and division of Islamic lands by colonial powers such as Britain and France. In this atmosphere of occupation and conflict between Muslims and the occupiers, two tendencies emerged for the liberation of the Islamic world from occupation. First - the liberal tendency, which emphasized human rights education and the principles of democracy and equality. Second, the Islamic tendency, which called for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate (especially after its abolition in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) and the Islamic government, and saw this as the only way to support the Islamic regions against Western invasion. 2. The establishment of the government of Pakistan, with the continuation of religious differences between Hindus and Muslims in 1947, was established in Pakistan. Pakistan is the first government in modern history to be based on religion. This experience made it possible for Muslims in other countries to establish an Islamic state in modern times. 3. Establishment of the State of Israel In 1948, the state of Israel was established in the land of Palestine, where the majority of the population was Muslim, and the Jews considered the creation of this state to be a fulfillment of the divine promise and the Muslims considered it a conspiracy. Therefore, the confrontation between them found a religious dimension. The establishment of the state of Israel was interpreted by Muslims as a new chapter in the Crusades and continued with the series of Arab-Israeli wars. The defeat of the Arabs led a group of Muslims to consider establishing an Islamic state in order to defeat Israel. 4. Military and paramilitary governments Most Islamic countries are ruled by military and paramilitary governments under the pretext

of threats such as Western colonization and Israel. In addition to these types of authoritarian regimes, the lack of democracy and liberal ideas is also effective in attracting and expressing religious ideas. 5. Corruption in the Islamic world, absolute order and lack of competitive system in power, has led to abuse and corruption in various fields, while freedom, education and healthy competition are the means of healing corruption, so some believe that the Islamic government is the only way to cure. 6. The Fall of the West, many people in the Islamic world use the interpretation of the fall of the West as a political slogan with the intention that if the Islamic world is ruled by the Islamic government, it can regain its flourishing and superior Islamic civilization. 7. The discovery of oil, the discovery of oil and its important role in energy production and the urgent need of new industries in developed countries promoted the political and economic position of producing countries, including some Islamic countries. The idea of forming an Islamic government was a need that Islamic societies felt in the face of Western colonialism and plunder and the use of this God-given wealth for growth and development. 8. New technology, sciences, technologies and industries have advanced, which due to the educational weaknesses of the Third World, the key to this growth is only in the hands of the West and the only role of the Third World is the consumption of the products of the advanced world. This one-way flow has dangerous consequences for the human world. Therefore, consumerism without participating in the production process has become a sinister thing for Muslims, and many see the Islamic government as a way out of this situation. The Islamic government, with its doctrines of scientism and rationality in the field of religion, could reform the relationship and make the relationship two-way. 9. Increasing disorder in the international system, local and ethnic international wars are observed, which has become more widespread with the mass media. The propaganda has spread the atmosphere of terror, insecurity and uncertainty about the events, which has provided a ground for the Islamists to be exiled by the Islamic government. 10. Sexual behavior, sexual behavior in the West is different from Eastern and Islamic societies. Most Muslims consider the Western way of sexuality as a kind of moral and human fall and reject it. They consider the Islamic government to be the only line of defense against this dissolution and fall. 11. Imamate in Iran, the 1979 revolution in Iran, led to the formation of the Shiite Islamic government in Iran, which, once established, revived the aspirations of those who seek to establish similar governments in other Islamic lands. Especially since the new government of Iran supported all Islamic and liberation movements and movements and had overcome the problems and obstacles of Islamic systematization at various stages. Of course, according to the Islamic Republic and the Islamic government, the Imamate is suitable for Shiites, not all Muslims (Elashmavi, 1996: 110).

The concept of political Islam in the second stage has the following meanings: A. Islam is Islam alone and it cannot be equated with human schools. Islam, reduced to capitalism or socialism, is no longer Islam. B. The West is not trustworthy and in order to get rid of its domination, it is necessary to confront the Western civilization in the military, political, scientific and cultural fields. C. In contrast to old and new patterns and systems of government, Islam has a special pattern for government and society. Colonialism, tyranny, discrimination against Muslims at the international level, and the essential distinction between the two civilizations of Islam and the West necessitate the formation of an Islamic state. D. For the success of Muslims in the world, we must first rule Islam and its specific views within the Islamic lands and overthrow authoritarian regimes. E. Ungodly rule is tyranny. For any government to be legitimate, it must be attributed to God, the Qur'an and the Prophetic tradition. The negative achievements of Western civilization are a sign of the justice-seeking spirit of this civilization and its consequent decline. F. The enactment of the law and its implementation must be in accordance with the Sharia in order to realize the real distinctions and capacities of Islam in various fields. G. The Islamic model is a divine model, not a human one, and will lead to the establishment of a civilization, neither Eastern nor Western.

4. Conclusion

The discourse formulation on which the main analysis was based is the product of a historical situation. The way politics is shaped in Iranian society has been both historically and traditionally historical. In Marx and Weber's conceptualization based on patrimonialism and the placing of the productive force in the hands of the state - in which water has played a central role - in practice, private property has been eliminated and the possibility of the emergence of social classes has been eliminated. Therefore, the only possibility was change from the outside, not from the inside. This factor of external change is what is called capitalism, modernization, colonialism, or colonial modernity. Under these circumstances, at the non-discourse level, the government has been the only factor in responding to and controlling the consequences of facing this external factor of change. In the meantime, one of the most serious mediators of the answers to the question "Why are we behind?" Was culture. Culture has been the unifying sign of all negative and positive programs. Both in the constitutional and Pahlavi period, backwardness was considered a cultural type and modernism became prevalent by despising traditional aspects of culture such as superstition and so on, and in the post-Islamic period, when indigenous culture was sanctified, the debate over culture and its definition was left to the government. This led to culture not only being considered as a tool, but also finding an internal relationship with the actions of the government. In the field of discourse, the emergence of different types of discourse at the religious level (the discourse of Islamic modernism and the discourse of political Islam) and secularism, or new connections of both, have developed around the conflict over culture (Black, 2015). Thus, the emergence of the discourse of cultural policy was a logical product of facing modernity in Iran. The basic idea was based on the principle that cultural policy in Iran is of modern descent, and since the formation of the current government in Iran, the government has officially taken on the task of engineering the field of culture. Given the historical situation and the way of dealing with modernity and capitalism in Iran (Shultes, 2010), among the types of cultural policy considered by Mc Guigan, the discourse of state cultural policy plays a fundamental role. Because the analysis of the discourse of cultural policy in Iran showed that almost all policies are governmental and in order to build a national identity in Iran has been in response to the issue of today. In this study, the role of intellectuals was focused. Because first, their role in the official policies and laws of the country should be examined and then the grounds for the adoption of these laws should be explored, which requires independent research. Based on the historical data examined, it was argued that the discourse of cultural policy in contemporary Iran was a governmental discourse based on the re-engineering of the spirit of society. The meaning that this discourse creates is a unifying meaning and in order to build the kind of national identity that was realized from the beginning of Qajar government and after facing modernity, the necessity of rethinking it. In the cultural order in which this discourse prevailed in Iranian society, everything that had challenged and hindered this unity was rejected by the dominant discourse. This rejection had common ground in the three periods under review, despite executive differences. The rationality of government, from which cultural policy emerged, is common to all three periods and is based on the nocturnal pattern. The model that has finally voted for cultural engineering in the country. Laws and documents that had the unrivaled support of the government supported the construction of a common cultural identity in such a way that there was essentially no room for opposition to this uniform cultural identity. Thus, rival discourses that did not have the opportunity for formal policy-making did not see in themselves the power of discourse conflict or the possibility of hegemony. Government cultural policy was a discourse supported and implemented by the government. Therefore, competing discourses cannot be easily identified. It is on this basis that it can be argued that the conflict with this discourse is fundamentally meaningless. Because in addition to hegemony, this discourse also had an economic and political structure and had the ability to suppress any demands from others and other discourses. But the main goal of this unrivaled discourse was to build a uniform national cultural identity, and the current government manifested itself in modernity, law, and nationalism in Iran. The most important reason that issued the official permission to enter the field of culture for the current government of Iran was the diversity of Iran's cultural context. Especially in the post-constitutional years,

different and at the same time common demands arose in different parts of Iran, all of which were a reaction to political and cultural centralism in Iran. The model of Western modernity has been synonymous with the rationalism of Western societies since the beginning of its formation in the general sense and some sought to instill the idea that for the modernization and development of growing societies they have no choice but to follow the path of the West and emulate its development model, and that the requirements and observance of the ideology of modernity are an inevitable part of it. They equate the rationalism of Western societies with the creation of new social organizations to replace them with traditional ones, as well as the industrialization of economics, secularism, and so on. They therefore suggest that a renaissance based on Western social values and institutions, and in particular the United States, should be at the forefront of its agenda. Modernity in the Pahlavi period also followed the same theory and considered itself obliged to observe the ideology of modernity. Therefore, this regime tried to establish the core and basic concept of liberal ideology, which was moral and religious freedom, economic freedom, humanism, legal and social partisanship, empiricism and positivism, natural and human rights, belief in the principle of historical progress, the originality of modern science. (Scientism), to declassify the world, to separate morality from the fabric of the world, secularism, capitalism, etc., in a theoretical and practical way, to implement in society. Due to the lack of a complete model and superficial understanding of the Shah and the drivers of modernist thinking about modernity, As well as the lack of cohesiveness of the quasi-modern Pahlavi government from internal cohesion and fit, instead of fundamental change and the use of positive aspects of modernity, the appearance of Western life and imitative behaviors were practically considered. Also, due to its non-acceptance by social and religious forces, the appearance of Western civilization became contradictory, which in the long run led to the fall of the Pahlavi government. In any case, various factors were systematically influential in shaping this pretense of the West, and the "the royal court" and its agents also played a role in this regard. In this article, some behaviors and examples that were done to help form a Western model at this time are mentioned. But these measures, as mentioned, for various reasons, not only did not help the strength of the Pahlavi regime and the country's development and progress, but also were among the factors that accelerated the fall and collapse of the Pahlavi government.

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